page 2 are competing interests, with a common currency used as the means to place a wellunderstood and comparable value on items. Given the nature of distributed resource management, it is natural to combine economic methods and resource management in grid computing to provide differentiated quality service levels. A market based model is appealing in grids because it matches the reality of the situation where clients are in competition for scarce resources. It holds the hope that it will provide a simple, robust, mechanism for determining resource allocations. However, before we can apply a market model to a grid, there exist two challenges that we must address. First, the model should be able to scale to a large number of machines and clients.
Traditional economic models have been studied for distributed resource brokering and these approaches usually focus on optimizing some global system-wide metric such as performance. In order to compute the market clear price, these approaches need to poll or estimate the global demand and supply from providers and consumers, which inevitably incurs high communication and computation overheads, and is inherently nonscalable. Second, it is crucial that the model has the capability of supporting many QoS points in the QoS space simultaneously. The model must not be one size fits all, because a particular client will likely value one QoS property more than others. For example, a client who analyses data or runs data mining tasks may wish to have high performance data access to cache space of temporary data, but may not care whether data are secured or permanently lost once the application completes. In another example, a client who archives critical data may desire a highly reliable storage at the cost of a degraded performance. The presence of this variety in QoS should allow the model to evaluate the Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 3 trade-offs and provide differentiated grid services at a level that satisfies the QoS properties for each client with a specific budget.
In this chapter, we will present two models, an auction market model where the providers offer resources and bid for consumers, and a posted-price market model where providers periodically adjust the price of resources that are available for purchase. Note that we use providers and sellers, consumers and buyers, interchangeably in this chapter.
In a grid system the resource providers typically possess dynamic characteristics such as work load and connectivity. For example, two machines may be able to supply the same amount of storage resources, however, the machine with higher availability and reliability will likely charge more for the better service. Our models distinguish producers by the resource quality they provide. Furthermore, our models deal with various QoS aspects of storage services. This leads to a more complex cost function that can determine the cost of a storage service from its QoS guarantees. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the models, we present a storage grid called Storage@desk (SD) and demonstrate how they work in SD. Storage@desk is a new virtual storage grid that can aggregate free storage resource on distributed machines and turn it into virtual storage pool transparently accessible by a large number of clients. We evaluate our models using a real world trace and present the results.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss the background in Section 13.2. Next, we present Storage@desk and its market models in Section 13.3 and 13. 4 . The evaluation results are presented in Section 13.5. Finally, we give some future research directions in Section 13.6 and conclude in Section 13.7.
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Background
A trade involves the exchange of goods, services, or both. The invention of money allows the indirect exchange in the markets where prices can be determined in many forms. Bargaining market was a dominating business practice for thousands of years, where the buyer and seller continue to improvise their offers during a trading time window and accept or reject each other's offer at the end of the negotiation. Both parties favor an agreement that maximizes their own utility. In this case, the buyer and seller are in direct communication and their offers are not extended to all possibly interested parties. Although bargaining is not disappearing, this ancient practice has given ways to auction market and posted-price market, especially with the advance of the internet and electronic commerce that shares the similar environment with our storage market. A few limitations can be blamed. First, bargaining involves a time cost as the buyer and seller negotiates for a final price to be agreed upon. In cases where time is critical, it would be difficult for both sides to reach a consensus within a short time window. They may have to make a compromised decision due to the time pressure. Second, as each side deals with only one other party, the information gathered by each side could be very limited that may also lead to a compromised decision. As a result, in both situations even if a consensus can be made, either side may possibly dissatisfy with the result because the utility is not maximized due to lack of time or information. Last, bargaining often needs human involvements in each stage of the negotiation process and autonomic bargaining bid in a continuous auction, whereas bids are kept secret in a closed auction. In this chapter, we choose to focus our attention on sealed-bid first-place auction for the following reasons. First, sealed-bid auction by nature prevents the buyers from knowing each other's bids, thus each buyer can evaluate the utility individually and make a quick decision on bids. It simplifies the bidding process and facilities the exchange of money and services. This is a highly desirable property in electronic commerce where minimum human intervene is needed. Second, because the winner is required to pay the highest price, it encourages the participants to reveal their true valuations. However, auction market has some limitations too. From the perspective of a buyer, she can only deal with one seller at one time and is uncertain about the result. The buyer having to commit to a resource quantity and price without knowing whether they will receive the resource makes it difficult to reason about how to accomplish a resource allocation. Also, the opportunity cost is quite high when a buyer has to go through several auctions before wining one. From the perspective of a seller, she may be forced to sell at an undesirable Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 6 price when there is lack of competitions, or unable to sell the desired quantity when there is lack of bids.
Posted-price market in electronic commerce is a nature extension from our daily experience, that is, we pay goods or services for the specified price in supermarkets, gas stations, restaurants, etc. The most significant advantage is that posted prices facilitate quick transactions. This makes possible by the sellers publicly announcing their prices.
Knowing the price, the buyer can reach a decision locally and other buyers' decision has no adverse effect if the seller has unlimited quantity of goods to offer. Furthermore, a buyer can potentially collect the prices from many sellers and make "smart" decisions. In the meantime, a seller can be certain about the profit when a transaction occurs.
Compared to auction market where the buyers have to decide whether to bid, to whom, and at which price, posted-price market requires the sellers to decide at which price to sell, for how many, and for how long. The burden is now on the sellers' shoulders.
In addition to bid-based models, previous research on applying market methods on distributed resource management has focused on commodity market models, where a resource is viewed as interchangeable commodity in a commodity market, in which the consumers buy the resource from the providers at a publicly agreed market price. Gcommerce [5] is an example of this commodity market model. In the G-commerce model, the key is to determine the price of a resource at which supply equals demand, i.e., market equilibrium. Therefore, G-commerce adopts a specific scheme of pricing adjustments based upon the estimated demand functions. Commodities markets assume Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 7 that all resources are identical within the market and that a market-wide price can be established that reflects the natural equilibrium between supply and demand. Some systems, such as G-commerce, have used such an approach to resource allocation -in their case CPU and disk for jobs. Unfortunately, as different providers naturally provide various levels of services, the assumption of equivalent resources is not a good fit for Storage@desk. Further, as Storage@desk exists in a dynamic environment which consists of a large number of distributed machines, it is difficult to adopt the Gcommerce approach to analytically determine equilibrium based on supply and demand formulas. Storage Exchange [6] mimics the stock exchange model and builds a double auction model, in which providers and consumers submit their bids to buy and sell storage service. As the clearing algorithm is crucial in terms of utilization and profit, different algorithms have been investigated in Storage Exchange to meet various goals.
In this chapter, we will focus on both the auction and posted price market models where prices or bids can be determined based on local information. The goal is to reduce the computation and communication cost, as well as to create a scalable algorithm in a distributed environment that consists of a large number of service providers and consumers.
Storage@desk
Before we present our storage market model, let us introduce Storage@desk [9] 
Architecture
Storage@desk, shown in Figure 13 . 
QoS Model
QoS is at the heart of Storage@desk. Storage@desk attempts to address the individual needs of its clients on a volume-by-volume basis. QoS is specified at volume creation and can also be updated throughout the volume's lifetime. For example, QoS may be changed to relax constraints that can no longer be met, to change budget or lifetime, etc. A client is free to change the QoS, which may become necessary when a client loses to others in a competition to a particular resource. We use a QoS vector Q = • Availability (A): we define availability as the percentage of time that all bytes of a volume are accessible to the client. This value is calculated by dividing MTTF (mean time to failure) by the sum of MTTF and MTTR (mean time to repair).
The specified value marks the minimum availability the client is willing to accept.
Since this is from the client's perspective, volume controllers can create replicas, use erasure codes, and/or dynamically migrate blocks in order to mask failures from less available resources.
• Budget (B): we define budget as the virtual concurrency a client has to purchase raw storage resources for each budget period. This budget will be used over a period time of the storage volume. When a budget is exceeded, a client will have to drop the request and release the resource.
• Capacity (C): we define capacity as the total amount of storage the client desires in blocks. SD models raw storage as a number of blocks, whose sizes are fixed at the volume creation time.
• Duration (D): duration defines the lifetime of a volume.
• Reliability (R): we define reliability as the probability that no data within a volume will be permanently lost. This value defines the minimum reliability rate the client is willing to accept.
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• Security (S): security is another QoS issue, and comes in many flavors and forms and various clients require differing levels of security. Some clients may require wire-level and storage-level data integrity guarantees while others may additionally require various privacy guarantees as well. Sometimes a volume may wish to prevent certain users from adding and removing blocks of data while other scenarios may allow for arbitrary addition of blocks of data, but limited deletion or replacement. Security can be addressed in all forms and at all stages in the Storage@desk system. Everything from storage level security, to wirelevel security; from block level to volume level must be addressed. At a minimum Storage@desk will support specification of the level of privacy and data integrity required on target storage machines, the level of privacy and data integrity on the wire, and the acceptable methods for authenticating clients to storage machines for access.
• Write Semantics (W): we define write semantics as either WORM (write-onceread-many) or Write Many. These semantics can be important clues for efficiently implementing other QoS metrics. For example, by specifying that a volume is WORM, caching can be aggressively used for blocks already written.
Each QoS property defines the minimum level of service required by a client. In Storage@desk, it is the volume controller that will attempt to find resources to meet the client's minimum requirements subject to the budget of the client. The client can also specify a different QoS property to optimize -for example, maximizing availability. <volume id="672362D1-06A6-45db-B4E1-A77D0B3AB4E5"> <name>UVa Volume</name> <owner>CN=Thomas Jefferson 1,E=jefferson@virginia.edu,OU=UVA Standard PKI User,O=University of Virginia,C=US</owner> <availability>99%</availability> <budget>1000</budget> <capacity>524288000 bytes</capacity> <duration>infinite</duration> <reliability>99.9%</reliability> <security> <storage> <privacy-level>encrypted</privacy-level> <integrity-level>checksum</integrity-level> </storage> <on-wire> <privacy-level>encrypted</privacy-level> <integrity-level>checksum</integrity-level> </on-wire> <authentication-mechanism>X.509</authentication-mechanism> </security> <performance allocation="50"> <read-write-ratio>2.5</read-write-ratio> <coherence-window>5 minutes</coherence-window> </performance> <optimize>cost</optimize> </volume> Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 14 Example 1: Illustrative document describing some QoS properties that a volume of storage might have. We have shown several different QoS properties, persistence, performance, availability, and integrity. Also included is an optional "allocation" for each. This indicates the relative importance the user attaches to different QoS elements.
Storage Market Model
In Storage@desk, competing independent clients or applications "purchase" storage resources from competing independent machines. In the auction market, storage machines hold auctions and solicit bids from a number of interested clients. At the beginning of the auction, each machine will announce the quantity of storage resources and history data on QoS properties. Because each client may receive bidding invitations from multiple storage machines, she will independently evaluate them and make a sealed bid to one machine. A bid includes quantity, and the price. Upon receiving bids, a storage machine will try to select a client that is willing to offer the highest price.
In the posted-price market, competing independent clients or applications purchase storage resources from competing independent machines. The model utilizes pricing agents to help storage providers determine the price for local resources. With the help of local search algorithms, pricing agents require no direct information of providers and consumers, which makes this approach very suitable for a grid environment. Thus, Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 15 pricing agents only need to adjust resource prices periodically based upon locally observed consumer demand.
In both market models, the consumers are free to use their own strategies to choose from which provider to purchase. They, however, can't always get what they want due to the budget constraints. When two clients have the identical QoS requirement, the one with larger budget should have a better chance to meet the QoS.
The use of a budget based system provides a mechanism to arbitrate between competing and likely conflicting clients and also provides a mechanism for system administrators to assign relative priorities between clients (or at least their purchasing power). We will use this market approach to produce a storage grid that can 1) achieve a relatively stable state; 2) fulfil client QoS when adequate budgets are available; and 3) degrades in accordance with relative budget amounts.
Assumptions
In the Storage@desk market model, we assume that the value, or relative worth, of a storage resource is ultimately determined by supply and demand. Traditionally, a market is said to be in equilibrium state when there is a perfect balance of supply and demand. In grid environment, as is often the case in real life, the balance is difficult to achieve and maintain because of the existence of unpredictable system dynamics.
Therefore we choose to measure market dynamics by the degree to which the utilizations We assume that the storage consumers and providers are self-interested "individuals" driven by personal goals. Obviously, a storage consumer aims to purchase storage resources that are affordable within the budget and satisfy the QoS.
Virtual Volumes
Clients create virtual volumes each of which has a particular size and consists of a number of blocks. A client will need to buy a number of blocks in the market. Each block represents the capability of storing a fixed amount of data on a specific machine. It is important to emphasize that we differentiate the blocks in terms of quality. For instance, some blocks are considered to have better QoS because the underlying machines are highly available and reliable. While the same quantity of disk storage is provided, the blocks with better QoS properties should become more expensive for two reasons. First, it is fair to reward a provider for a better services rendered. Second, it will help the clients to tell a "good" block from a "bad" one, thus spend the budget efficiently and have better chance to achieve QoS goals.
For simplicity, we say that the market consists of a finite number S of blocks, distinguishable in terms of quality, from which a consumer may choose to create a virtual 
Storage Providers
A storage provider, as a storage machine, sells a number of blocks out of the available free disk space it has via some allocation policy, such as a fixed amount of dedicated storage, some percentage of currently unused storage, etc. Each storage machine is responsible for determining how many raw storage blocks it has to offer, for how long, and at what price (with the help of a pricing agent). All of the storage managed by a single storage machine is equivalent so that a storage machine simply has to determine and advertise the number of blocks available and a single price point for any of them. However, as we pointed out before, storage resources on two machines are not necessarily equivalent. For each storage machine, the revenue is calculated as the product of the price and the number of used blocks. There exists a software agent on each machine, which is called the auctioning agent in the auction market and the pricing agent in the posted-price market, respectively.
In the auction market, the auctioning agent will hold the auction for the resources on the storage machines. When the auction starts, the agent on the i-th machine sends the
invitations to the potential interested buyers in the form of (y i , q i ), where y i represents the number of the blocks and q i the history data on the QoS properties. A bid from the j-th machine can be represented as (x j, p j ), where x j represents the number of the blocks the machine needs and p i the price willing to pay. It is important to note that x j is less than or equal to y i . When the auction ends, the agent will select the machine with the highest price and award the requested resources. In case there is a tie, the earliest bid wins. If there are more resources than what the machine needs, e.g., y i > x j if the j-th machine wins, the agent will go through the buyer list in the descending order of their bidding price and repeat the selection process.
In the posted-price market, as each machine wants to maximize the revenue, the pricing agent will leverage the pricing power to affect the utilization and in turn the revenue. We will discuss the pricing algorithm in details in Section 13.4.5. We define a price vector p = [p 1 , …, p S ] to represent the prices of the blocks, where p i is the price of the i-th blocks. Once a client makes a purchase, this storage service will be rendered by the storage provider for a predefined period of time. It is the machine's job to make sure the blocks solely available to the client. It is up to volume controllers to choose simple or complex strategies to solve this problem. In this chapter, a volume controller follows a simple strategy in both the auction and posted-price market.
Storage Consumers
In the auction market, the controller can only submit a bid once in each bidding time period. In this research, we assume that the clients have high valuations, that is, they are willing to spend their entire budgets to secure the needed resources. It is never desirable for these clients to have nothing, because they need storage resources to hold their data. Thus, the clients will bid with the maximum prices within their budgets.
In the posted price market, pricing agents update prices and clients purchase storage on a regular basis, so clients may either stay put or opt to choose new machines to hold the volumes for the upcoming period. This decision process is affected by two questions: whether they have sufficient currency for the remaining time unit, and whether they have met or will have a better chance to meet the QoS. Given the answers to the questions, a client will try to move the volume's blocks to a less expensive machine if the budget becomes tight and to a machine with better QoS attributes if the volume QoS is not met. For example, a client has a QoS requirement for availability of 99.9%. Based on our observation in [11, 12] , it is a reasonable approximation that a client needs to create three replications on different machines in order to achieve that goal. If a machine Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 21 becomes less reliable, it may become necessary for the client to move the replica to a more reliable machine. If the budget becomes insufficient, the client may need to move a replica to a less expensive machine or reduce the number of replicas. It is possible that a client does not have sufficient budget to compete for "good" resources. As a result, the client has to make the trade-offs between various QoS criteria -including trade-offs between the amount of space one can get and the quality of the service one receives.
Storage Resource Pricing
At its heart, Storage@desk is a storage scavenging system that must deal with machines that are typically under the direct control of desktop users. Those machines often exist in an environment that is highly unstable and dynamic. This implies that those machines experience dramatic changes in load, disk usage, connectivity, uptime, etc.
depending on the whims of the user sitting at the console. Additionally, administrative domains may enforce policy leading to large, coordinated downtimes and periods of unavailability. However, the chaotic nature of this environment should not prevent us from delivering reasonable level of QoS. Indeed, we believe that local search pricing agents will hold the most promise for Storage@desk. A local search pricing agent requires no assumption or knowledge of other providers and of the consumer population.
Such an agent utilizes a local search algorithm that periodically adjusts the resource price based upon the demands observed in the previous and current time windows.
Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 22
We choose to employ two classes of local search algorithms, greedy algorithm and derivative-following (DF) algorithms. A greedy pricing agent starts with a pre-defined price and makes small changes (increase or decrease) as long as the demand increases.
Such an agent stops changing the price when it cannot see any improvement in demand.
At this point, it is considered that a good price is found. Ideally, the price is close to the optimal value. The price moves in a small step δ, which is chosen randomly from a specified range; in the simulation we use a uniformly random distribution between 10% and 30%. We have found a random increment helps reduce the negative impacts from unpredicted dynamics in a distributed environment. Algorithm 1 lists the pseudocode of the greedy algorithm.
In contrast, a derivative-following pricing agent will not terminate the search when there is no increase in demand. Rather, a DF agent will reverse the search direction at that point. A DF agent starts with a pre-defined price and changes the price in the same direction at each observation window until the most recent demand is observed to decrease from the demand in the previous window. In that case, the agent reverses the search direction and begins to make price changes in the other direction. When the demand again decreases the price movement will be reversed again. Therefore, the agent is able to track the changes in the observed demand and react fairly quickly to reverse the undesirable trend. In addition, it is very intuitive and requires only local knowledge. The latter makes it possible to develop a highly efficient solution in a grid, which involves a large number of distributed machines. Algorithm 2 lists the pseudocode of the derivative-following algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Greedy Pricing Algorithm

Set direction as UP or DOWN based on initial observations FOR each time interval
In conclusion, our market-based model has three advantages. First, a storage machine is only required to know the local demand. There is no need for a storage machine to know prices from others, although they may compete for consumers. Nor does a storage machine need to know demands from all consumers. Second, a storage machine is allowed to leverage independent pricing power to compete for positions in the market. Thus, rather than one price fits all, the market recognizes the quality differences between storage resources and enables prices to reflect those differences. Third, with the
Algorithm 2: Derivative-Following Pricing Algorithm
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Evaluations
Using our market model, we want to provide two things with respect to availability and resource allocation. First, the overall resource allocation system and pricing performance in the system can be stable. Second, when resources are available, the resource allocation mechanism must perform efficiently and effectively -meaning that volume controllers make the proper decisions and can purchase the proper resources to meet their availability goals. Additionally, the resource allocation process should degrade such that it favors those who have allocated higher budgets to their storage when all other things are equal.
To evaluate our model, we construct a trace-driven simulation. In this simulation, we choose to study volume availability to demonstrate the effectiveness of our market model. We simulate our model using trace data, which we collected from 729 public machines in the classrooms, libraries, and laboratories at the University of Virginia. An analysis of this data has been published as a feasibility study of Storage@desk [9] . 
the time. There were several events where large number of machines went down due to network partition, power outage, and scheduled maintenance, etc., which are displayed as the downward spikes in the figure. Figure 13 .4 shows the number of machines categorized by their availabilities in terms of nines over the 10-week span. We use three-nine machines to represent the machine group whose availability is greater than 99.9%, two-nine machines for availability greater than 99%, and one-nine machines for availability greater than 90%.
The majority of the machines had an availability of 2 nines or 3 nines. Although more than 500 machines started with 3 nines at the first week, their availabilities gradually decreased as the time went by. This was expected given the unreliable nature of machine usage on these desktops. At the same time, the number of one-nine and two-nine machines increased significantly. The population of zero-nine machines remained steady for 10 weeks. In the end, there were about 60 three-nine machines, 200 two-nine machines, 400 one-nine machines, and 75 zero-nine machines. and 300 (high budget), in a random, uniform distributed fashion. Also, a volume is randomly given an availability requirement of 1 nine, 2 nines and 3 nines. This assignment creates a good mix of various budgets and availabilities among the volumes.
In our simulation, we assume that each volume consists of one block and each machine has 10 blocks available for Storage@desk, so each machine can hold up to 10 volumes.
Under a pre-defined budget and availability requirement, each client creates one volume by purchasing blocks and makes a number of replicas for the volume in order to satisfy the availability requirement. The number of replicas a client tries to make is determined by how many nines the client desires. For example, a client with a requirement of 3 nines will make three replicas of the volume. As we pointed out earlier, this is a reasonable choice given the fact that the majority of the machines have an availability of 90% or higher. We make sure that one machine will not hold two replicas of the same volume, so a client will distribute three copies on three different machines.
From the trace, we know the status of each machine, in other words, whether the machine is available, at every five-minute interval. A volume is available as long as there is at least one replica accessible, otherwise it is unavailable. Thus, we can easily obtain MTTF and MTTR for each volume, and compute its availability. We simulate our model in two market settings, the over-supply and under-supply cases. Note that 729 storage machines can hold 7,290 volumes, which is the supply in
the market. In the over-supply case, there are 3,500 clients, i.e., 3,500 volumes in the system, which consume 95% of supply if each volume makes 2 copies on average. Due to the budget constraints on some volumes, the actual consumption is much lower, about 76% at the beginning of the simulation as shown in Figure 13.7 (a) . In the under-supply case, there are 4,500 clients demanding 120% of supply.
In the auction market, each storage machine will randomly solicit bids from 60 clients. In the posted-price market, storage machines set the initial price as Price initial = (budget / demand) / duration, where budget is the total amount of currency in the system at the beginning of the simulation, demand is the number of blocks needed by all the clients, and duration is the number of weeks in the simulation (10 weeks). We intentionally lower the initial price by 10% to create an initial leeway for customers with a tight budget.
.
Price and Allocation Stability
In this section we study the mean price and mean utilization distributions under two demand scenarios. Figure 13 .5 show the mean price distribution in the auction market model for the oversupply case (a) and the under-supply case (b). In both cases, while the prices increase slowly from week 2 to week 9 for machines have less than 3 nines, they jump in the end of the simulation. The weekly increase is significantly larger for threenine machines. This is caused by the fact that the low-budget clients who do not have
sufficient funds to win bids in the beginning of the simulation are able to afford goodquality machines later on. As we will see later, the posted-price market model can avoid this problem, as low-budget clients manages to purchase "cheap" resources from lowquality machines.
a) Over-supply case (b) Under-supply case Among 1,045 migrations from all the volumes, 64% come from the low budget volume, 20% from the medium budget volume, and 16% from the high budget volume. These numbers are quite close to those from the over-supply case. It indicates that the volumes with higher budgets do have a better chance to quickly find reliable resources and meet the availability. Therefore, we consider, in the over-supply case, the system becomes stable when the machines reach steady utilizations at week 8 and the clients with sufficient budgets complete the volume migrations. In the under-supply case, the large demand has already confined the market movements to a smaller window, thus the system becomes stable rather quickly when the machines remain steady utilizations since week 4.
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Meet Availability Goals and Adherence to Budgeted Priorities
For each client, the key is to meet the availability goal under the budget constraint.
It is expected, to a high probability, a volume should be able to meet a relatively lower availability for a wide range of the budgets, because in this case a volume only needs a small number of replicas that can be done with a small budget. On the other hand, when a volume needs a high availability, the volume has to purchase a large quantity of storage resources for replicas. This can be difficult when the budget is limited. Therefore, there exists a contention for storage resources and the budget constraint will eventually affect the probability of a volume can meet the availability. As the posted-price market produces more stable prices and utilizations than the auction market, we will only show the results from the former in the section. In the posted-price market, both pricing algorithms can prioritize clients based on their budgets, and we will only present the results from derivative-following algorithm here. Figure 13 .12 and 13.13 show the percentage of volumes that satisfy the availability of 1 nine and 3 nines, respectively. In each figure, (a) illustrates the over-supply case and (b) presents the under-supply case.
From Figure 13 .12, we can see that the budget plays a small role for one-nine volumes.
In the over-supply case, 88% of high budget volumes meet the 1 nine availability at week 10, while 87% of low budget volumes do. This small difference becomes even smaller in the under-supply case. It indicates that low budget is sufficient for a volume that needs a low availability. The situation changes when a volume has an availability of 2 nines. The chance for a low budget volume has 2 nines availability decreases from 87% at week 1 to 36% at week 10 in the over-supply case and from 87% to 33% in the under-supply case. In
Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 37
comparison, above 90% of the medium and high budget volumes still have a good chance to meet the availability requirements. In this case, the budget draws a clear distinction between low budget volumes and higher budget volumes, while medium and high budget still can be considered equivalent. The latter can no longer hold true as shown in Figure   13 .11 when the volumes demands an availability of 3 nines, where each volume needs to purchase storage for three replicas. While about 92% of high budget volumes meet the goal at week 10, the percentage for medium budget volumes and low budget volumes drop to 70% and 8% in the over-supply case, and 70% and 7% in the under-supply case.
In summary, the system is able to achieve, in both cases, a partial ordering of client QoS fulfilment matching client budget ordering, which clearly serves the purpose of the budget constraint. This should encourage clients to make trade-offs between resource price and various QoS attributes.
Future Research Directions
This study enhances our understanding of how market approach helps with storage resource allocation in a new storage grid. However, much remains to be learned about the agent behavior and market model in Storage@desk.
• We will take computing and network resources into considerations to give our model a higher level of realism. This will inevitably introduce new research challenges. When a client purchases various resources from multiple providers, it
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needs to carefully make a purchase plan ahead of time in order to coordinate the consumption of different resources at the desirable time.
• We will explore new QoS properties, e.g., security and performance, and support them in our market model. Their impacts on resource management can be twofold. First, like the previous problem of multiple resource purchase, a client need to make a good plan in order to simultaneously achieve multiple QoS properties.
It may come to a time when it is not possible to achieve all desired QoS properties. At that time the client has to prioritize one or more most important
properties. Second, we plan to research other possible pricing algorithms, e.g., based on genetic algorithm or ant colony algorithm.
• We will introduce the concept of penalty to the market. A penalty will be assessed when a resource provider cannot meet its pre-specified QoS level. For example, for a resource provider advertising an available of 99.9%, it needs to pay a certain amount of penalty for the time periods that it did not provide a three-nine service. This will provide an incentive for providers to honestly announce the quality of their services.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a market-based resource allocation model for Storage@desk, a new storage grid where software agents determine local prices for resource providers based on the derivative-following algorithm. We describe both the Wiley STM / Editor: Book Title, Chapter 13 / H. Howie Huang, and Andrew S. Grimshaw/ filename: ch13.doc page 39 auction market model and the posted-price market model in the Storage@desk architecture. We use a trace-based simulation to evaluate both models and show that the posted-price market model is able to produce a more stable market with higher utilization.
In the posted-price market, once the price, quantity, and quality of storage resources are advertised, storage consumers can choose from which providers to buy, and how many. With the help of the volume controller, a client can make trade-offs among many
QoS attributes and compose a service that achieves the desirable QoS under a specific budget. A good resource allocation can be achieved by the cooperation from two sides:
providers adjust prices for their resources in accordance with the demand they experience, while consumers adjust their allocation as reacts to the QoS experienced and the price changes based on the amount of currency left in the budget.
